

Feb 89

Themes/Issues

1. SU as seeking acknowledgment of symmetry.

Questions
for Dave

3. What risks were they willing to accept?

2. Did "they" under-estimate, or over-estimate risks?
(Both, in some respects)

4. What routes could have led to ^{US-SU} conflict?
to invasion of Cuba? etc? his own view? GW?

5. What did K plan, in it, on Berlin?
What would he have done if...

6. How could invasion of Cuba go?

7. Super-secrecy (PSALM) for Sept 7 or (statute 6 Sept?) ^{JFK}

8. Wf wasn't SAMs deployed first, for deterrence?

Was there an warning, a deadline, on Berlin?

Was there covered. with election?

e.g. fear that USG would take stronger
risks, if it discovered SSMS before they were up,
after election?

or, was presence of SAMs thought to be enough? to deter
(It almost was: 4 Oct Wright memo)

But see

Thurs / Friday

6 Feb 89

11

9. Did K/SU not consider chance that his message would fail? Plan on SU response to US moves?

(as SNIE Oct 17 assumed, "rational, calculating, ~~appears~~")

[Ref not: - risks are high

- risks are underestimated of SNIE;

which makes the high]

(However, SNIE's assumption that SU must

have planned to respond abroad, if necessary

- about entering world (vs. "hands, belly, knife...")

- leads to over-estimate of risks of some aggressive US actions, due to US caution.

"Bring effects of
'paranoia' - of
reputations ("rational")
aggressive response.

(see Nitzke, 1961, Berlin)

10. Invasion planning in October

(^{Hyp.} based on more threat, evidence, suspicion of
possible SSMS than Ode wanted - then or now - to
admit, in view of 1) Rife/Kratz changes

2) USG (e.g. McComb) reassurances, before
election - which went beyond insertion evidence
(see McComb - DCI: - and

(e.g. SNIE) ^{Pres} (Did OSB really feel confident - despite evidence,
suspicious, SU would not do it?

In view of: what?

- Warning

- Balashov?

- introp of other SU statements?

This incredulity would not have looked good; nor would
PSALM, which would have looked suspicious (like FOR's
warning before Pearl Harbor) - e.g. as if JFK planned to cancel tell the.

(Didn't he plan at least to be able to conceal
[print books - $\frac{3}{4}$ Rajat?]) "western evidence/
(possible/probable) false claim - tell after election

or "tell me know for some"

or "tell me how decided what to do."

(Perhaps wrong was about refugee reports - false reports.

Got - PSALM initiated after II-28 as "published" -

to which Pres did not want to react.

F. MA. and anger at

11. JFK fear of effort on Cuba, if having his
assurances falsified (see JFK - Michigan)

12. Was there no intent (possibly) to involve Cuba -
about SSMS?

13. Actual risk of use of SSMS presented by USG, if
Cuba attacked. However, distant effort.

SU FU Shunt - Use

"Markers" - "loss of control"

Cf. too much in Europe;

PI's

14. Relation of low name to elections. (see

(+ US money!

assurances (which constituted "commitment,"
created "crisis")

(see Michigan - JFK 29 Nov 62)

(SU not going to tell tell after election - to spare JFK

'embarrassment' - a favor? (and insurance vs. JFK response
to Rogers pressure! But why not hold back whole operation till

after election?

1989 answer: SU fear of invasion in October!

From mole in Morgeson? (error? "Proposal rejected"

but Morgeson was not rejected — and it needed
an invasion — and could have been linked to one!

(see 1964-65! 34A → TG → RT → invasion!
as well as Cuba I!

and Maneuvers: spring '62

Oct 15 — who planned, initially?

What was "rejected" in March '62?

Wh, if ever, were ambitious goals of Morgeson
rejected (as opposed, perhaps, to planned schedule,
as of March, culminating in Oct!)

see Midway —
JFK, 29 Nov 62

Was the failure of SU to shoot SAMs — (or before)
Oct 22, or after, simply the continuation of a SU
stalling plan (meant to be terminated in Nov 8-10, not
before);

like, -She + U-2, 1960

- JFK + CI (Stevenson at UN)

- Harlan + Chernobyl

- Andropov + KAL-007?

2)

Hyp: There was an SU/R plan to slow down,
delay, avoid, JFK response to missiles:

maneuvers, lack of clear warning, justification, threat to Russia!
(camouflage planned, but rejected)

6) Urgency (e.g. not exploiting SAMs) based on fear of invasion
before election!

— SU been a intimidation, provocation

Themes

1. A lesson: — ^{Lesson} Explan makes are still going
(Count operators)
— so mis-learning can still take place!
(of lessons, and of B+W!)
— (an invasion
— and role of how "misperception"

2. Hidden fight over "equality — equal rights, status"

3. SU "threat" to ^{neutralize} US global + European FU threats.
(not to ultimate US FS threat; equality of FS threats)
but, threat of instability, moving both,
replacing one-sided US FS threat.

4. SU ^{FU} threat to remove US threat/option of
invading Cuba

then, consolidating SU/Comm/Castro "base" in Cuba.
(mocking JFK capitulation of 1960!

and preventing JFK undermining of Cuba I!

(JFK/RFK felt at least as strong about

5. joint FA patterns

removing Castro, as R about Ortega
Khodabey
Rovinsky

5. See joint FA patterns —

causing crisis for JFK (starting Oct 16)

and for K (starting Oct 22):

fight for both: Oct 27

K gave in, under threat.

(not a compromise, but then this time

proposals as of morning Oct 27)

(no K proposal on night of Oct 26,

which JFK "accepted." That was

a fore-saying description by JFK, though

↓
the... but... proposal was K's!

- US view of "non-party", argument of rights
- N: good vs. bad (Real War)

- our global responsibilities
 obligations
 countries ^{and} states, concern
 (result of: division (Asia; ME and / East / West Europe)
 on strength (superiority)

(see K to JFK at Vina: ✓

"We have commitments."

Don't "misunderstand"

K: you have subtle ways of making things

NC

- our rights to threaten or exploit ^{use} violence
 (both are "uses" of violence)
 (for "good," "we do," "threats," "commitments," "responsibilities")
 (We did not ask to be watched at the
 gates, but there is no one else")

NC

- right to control, exploit
 (These follow from use, and right to
use, superior force; it "corrupts"
 "Trust" + "aid" ...

- right to Open Door - "level playing field"
 (in others' countries:
 at least / not ^{and} with other foreign
 countries, but not with the
 domestic firms there).

- Open Door wanted to US attacks, if necessary.
 vs. (China Miss (1961)) SSMs (SAMs) 1962
Missiles Miss, 1961 and not shooting

John

→ Strategy of provocation of provocation
can of "
fake of "

(Cuba I; Moscow; TG/34A/Plinian; Nicaragua

- Contra strategy (?) → cause general uprising, revolt,
by harassing, sabotaging economy (get any to defect?
see CIA, Aug 62
Chile 1970-73; Guatemala?
(Brazil?)
Nicaragua?
Rostow/CIA, Oct 62
see 1961 dialog with CIA, Tech Services?)
mid-

- US from (SU hits?) of horizontal line
Cuba - Berlin
see SNIE

- Competition in machismo

(see LBJ/aiders; LBJ/RFK; me to Hon. Graham;
McG's Tainters; McN to WAA demonstrators;
Vann/VC, Korten, 72; R. MA's; JFK/RFK/Castro

Braun-Quill
(RFK like R/North vs. Khedafa or Ortega?!)

- Did Castro exaggerate prob. of invasion; manipulate
Sovs, hop half into support + pledge, actually
with SSAs?

Shirley + Tim

Thurs

→ Strategy of provocation of provocation
even of "
fake of "

(Cuba I; Moscow; TG/34A/Plinian; Nicaragua

→ Castro strategy (?) → cause general uprising, revolt,
by harassing, sabotaging economy (get any to defect?
see CIA, Aug 62
Chile 1970-73; Guatemala?
(Brazil?)
Nicaragua?)
Rostow/CIA, Oct 62
1961 ^{mid-} disloy with CIA, Tech Services?
ISN'T THIS ALL BEING DONE TO NICARAGUA?
(Branch + Cuba)

→ US fear (SU bits?) of horizontal use
Cuba - Berlin
see SNIE

→ Confrontation in mechanisms

(see LBJ/aiders; LBJ/RFK; see to Hon. Graham;
McG's Tatters; McN to WAA demonstrators;
Van/VC, Koutou, 72; R. MA's; JFK/RFK/Castro

Branch - Chile
(RFK like R/North vs. Khaddafi or Ortega?!))

→ Did Castro exaggerate prob. of invasion; manipulate
Sovs, hop half into support & pledge, actually
into SSAs?

Heineke + Tamm

Branch +
Cuba, 61

Did it all focus:

- 27 1. Saw report see minutes as defining mission; (after admission)
and this as urgent?
(changing balance? yes?)
What did McCone (Kestly?) see as main reason?
(Is Kestly alive?)

Did they see it as indication for K of Berlin breakdown?
(Querry?)

2. Did they see Low assurances as "defensive" weapons
as ambiguous, evasive, non-conclusive?

3. Did US officials like RFK + JFK believe this our warnings
||| (42) would be effective? (+ This both denied
Why no K announcement? thinks, and subverted them: not how
"lies, omens"

If US planned to withdraw, the moment would
lead to blockade, or invasion (or commitment / way to
attack missiles;
like Migs in Nicaragua)

Ask Soves: What was the understanding of Sept
warnings?

... of private US warnings?
Effects - how?

Why didn't they (?) see overflight as the big problem?

(Nyp: Too late for US to react?

- give election?
- give advance of SI warning?
- give SU warning speed of
deployment over in Cuba?
(like Pearl Harbor attack: none of
zeros)

What were they not telling?

Still?

0. Motives for US FS buildup; esp, US FO threats (Kilpatrick) ^{Bullen} X
(Effect of Cuban deployment on)

1. Mongoose.

X (only cursory discussion, by official denial)

1A. JFK priority to Mongoose; ^{JFK} resolutions for invasion

2. Invasion planning: ^{spring '62}
Oct '62

X (day earlier (MCN) or upturn)

3. Assass. efforts.

lack of belief (by MCN, others) - ^{significant} change in strategic balance, or power

4. JFK willingness to trade

IRBMs. ("Munich" - as assigned to Stevenson).

5. RFK offer of private deal.

X (MCN)

6. RFK ultimatum on IRBMs

[^{Secret:} For Brennan + MCN: this was a bluff; ^{X (MCN)}
w/ 48 hrs.

7. RFK warning ^{new} on shootdown.

X (don't know, ^{the} focus on it)

8. Mongoose after Cuban II: - through March 63

- after " 63-Nov 63

- 1964

9. PAAFM, + similar restrictions on disarm.

X

14. Leves: What did K "learn" about JFK - + USG - from Bay of Pigs? ^{winners!} Vain? Wall? Kilpatrick? Bullin Feb 25?

10. (Leves: What K planned for Berlin,

if missiles remained? What was his aim, needs, a thing? idea - (Korean war?)

11. Leves: What K ^{not just, planned} would have done, on Berlin or Italy ^(X)
if missiles struck; or if invasion. ^{SCHLES, RFK 512}

15. How certain was K that JFK would not disarm? What did he think/dope/feel would happen if he did?

12. Leves: What was nature of warnings & assurance on Berlin and on election; and timing of project (w/ot election? To invasion plans?) ^{WHY NOT SAY FIRST? (WHAT WAS RUSH?)}

13. Leves: Did offer of a private deal on IRBMs have any effect at the time? Help later? ^(X)

Did SU foretell a high risk of this?

WAS THERE AN INTENT TO BOMB NVN, IN 1964? TO INVADE SVN? (" " NVN?) SHOULD SU HAVE FORESEEN THESE, OR NOT?

38? non-Bullin crisis of '63?

US: What would JFK have done - if missiles not disclosed, tell "operations"?

WHY WARHEADS SENT? 45, 274-75

"my" refs: Vienna

Paris

My CFR seminar

→ Crisis Pattern - F.M.A.

[Dunbar]

Dilatation]

- Ritz interview

- " note

- Michigan

- OSR - Aug 23, Sept 6

- Kilpatrick speech (FU) (Chagos) (Hans)

my proposed message to K, by JFK on up!

JFK July 25? speech

CHECK WITH RIKYNE #

- Effort of Kilpatrick - on humiliation; desire to change "balance" (of FS)

- Aim of SU to match/equal US FS cap - here, inhibit
US FU threat (e.g. on Berlin) (allow SU to offer me unilateral),
as to China: to threaten SU re-use, without too much fear
US escalation (but it triggers SU FS);

||| US FU threat rested on MONOPOLY OF FS/PREEMPTIVE THREAT,
HENCE MONOPOLY OF THREAT TO ESCALATE.

(Jahag, in '90s: superiority in FS threat
or even parity " " "

is a better basis for US threat of FU in case
there is absence of FS threat by US
or on either side
or (want) SU monopoly of FS threat
(= US, 1955-64)

- deal with Berlin (inc. warnings) + election

- JFK speech before Oct 15 (K anticipated, content on?)

What was learned from crisis?

1. Sovs: a) to be cautious with US reaction
sub. after
P. as decision
to ignore law
- NOT TO RELY ON LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON US! (Schlesinger, 505)

b) Not to put MRBMs in NVN
(or Migs in Nicaragua)

c) Not to refrain from and to DRV

- to refrain from putting SAMS, Migs, in NVN

d) TO SEEK MILITARY PARITY (the hard way) in Nicaragua
not, McN claim
BEFORE EXPECTING DIPLOMATIC PARITY McN position

US
US: 11. Armed brotherhood: nuclear crisis.

2. Not: Sovs don't have total control over small allies.

- Not: (immediately): STOP MONGOOSE; give up (?) invasion thoughts.

3. Not: bring in real experts on local affairs: + Sovs.

- McN Claim: McN's law (immediately): not true, from Cuba II (→ VN) 100

4. Sovs always back down in end?

"During the service" (McN 52) - Scature, Junior

5. "Unilateral pressure" is best, + work; avoid "victorious" action (Ball, 25)
(Blockade; \Rightarrow 34A, RT, troops ("not irreversible" 49

- "GOOD DOCTOR" TACTIC (if you expect to "deal" eventually) RNC - pg 28, 65!

6. 34A (= mongoose) is worth doing.

(for provocation?)

7. Avoid, if possible, invasion ^{or bombing} (NVN) that might bring in SU or China. (not so much: that would fail) as in Cuba

8. Not: be ready to make major concessions rather than get in large, limited war

(Maybe: ... and to avoid war with SU or China).

- committing efforts of limited combat (RT, troops)

9. No lessons about: - actual combat of us. "McN's law")

- fear of Cuba (Vance, Ayres...)
to stimulate us

- reliance on small ally/China/Portugal

- CR, civil war, guerrilla war

- public support during long war

10. (LSD, NOT N): Don't rely on RU threat.

- when did Keston get his estate, Oct 10
Did JFK believe he had a Paper name, Moore,
who was buying his house?

Was this a hidden name - name?

How did JFK meet?

(see summary of Fomin contact)

(Walter E. Fomin, 1964)

- "First letter" on 26th, always described wrongly;
2d, also, as "raising the ante". B+W, 255

- 256: were there 2 Dob/JFK talks: one in Embassy,
one in prison?

- Role of action:

- F.M.A... result, etc.

- response to violent attack

370, B+W

- by Sours (on SNIE; Mikoyan; JFK's est. of K)

- by JFK (to match Sours plan)

- JFK

- Paris issue (B+W 257

rights

military Paris

dip. "

- Castro mentions (AA; ...)

(vs. B/W 259

on Castro / Marking

- What is the meaning of the Einstein/Oran statement?

"New Things" - ^{appropriate} post-war (see Shokryanov,
B+W 259-60)

See Handoff,

B+W 91

Sorenson, 93

Oct Planning } Eth JFK gave more credence to admitted to SSMs
→ PSALM } or (with expecting SSMs, or big man) thought he would
miracle (as if as, Sept, Oct — a real week, or
without SSMs — as PDS judges, 9 Feb 89)

- ^{US} defined relations: to Cuba (USA...)
- US "refining" of status (JFK — McN? — willing to reorganize)